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Nation 1964-1970
In 1964, The Economic Opportunity Act, the opening shot in The War On Poverty and a
core program of the Great Society, was signed by President Lyndon Johnson. In The Nation, the
liberal intelligentsia reacted with a mix of curiosity and pessimism. One writer interpreted the
ambitious new programs as actually backwards-looking, writing, “The Great Society is to be
achieved by extending the basic precepts of the New Deal...That the Great Society is so rooted in
the past can be explained by the President’s political origins. Mr. Johnson was weaned on the
New Deal as a young Congressman, lost it in the postwar world as he found his way to great
wealth, the majority-leadership and the Vice Presidency, and has at last regained it in the
Presidency”.1 Another looked apprehensively at the balance between the two major parties,
arguing that the increasing popularity of the democratic party, the threat of it becoming nearly
unchallenged by Republicans through electoral maneuvering in which the Republican rightward
shift allowed for the Democrats to take up the entire center of politics. They wrote, “When one
party dominates, the possibility of wheeling-dealing corruption is ever present. This is the case in
any society with a dominant Center party. When liberals of convenience manage the program
and there is no effective force to check or correct the course, the achievement is apt to be limited,
falling far short of what is both technically possible and morally desirable”.2 As The Great
Society went from prospective legislation to the law of the land, writers at the magazine
continued trying to make sense of a program whose legacy is still debated today. As it became
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clear that Johnson’s term was going poorly, writers began to mourn the potential of The Great
Society. In an article called “Requiem For A Great Society”, a writer blamed the failure of the
Great Society on Johnson almost exclusively, writing, “The truth is that Johnson never really
transcended his past experience. His political style was fixed, and it was probably inevitable that
this program should be sundered by the age-old tension between ends and means. While the
Great Society’s stated objectives were equal to our highest aspirations, Johnson failed to
understand that these goals could never be reached by the traditional methods of interest
politics”.3
The Economic Opportunity Act established the Office of Economic Opportunity, and
began the eleven-pronged initial assault4, but its most important contribution was to rethink the
methodology of anti-poverty programs. The War on Poverty programs superseded local and state
governments. Even more controversially, the doctrine of Maximum Feasible Participation
embedded into the act attempted, with various degrees of success, to share power with local
groups.5 The Great Society has been interpreted and re-interpreted by historians, from its impact
on the civil rights movement to its conceptions of gender. As the programs at its heart recede
further and further into historical memory, analysis of the Great Society has increasingly been
focused on the interplay between federal programs, local groups attempting to wield power as
mandated by those programs, and the differing levels of success they had in asserting their
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independence from local governments, used to a more paternalistic model of anti-poverty
initiatives.6
The Nation’s writers did not have a monopoly on interpreting The Great Society---more
accurately, they reacted to and were part of a broader discourse. No single voice was as
important to this conversation as Lyndon Johnson.7 And it was that voice that gave the opening
sales pitch for The Great Society to his country. In a speech at the University of Michigan 8,
Johnson unfurled the blueprints for the most ambitious domestic program in American history.
He announced lofty, almost utopian plans to realize the potential of the most prosperous country
in world history by transforming it into a juster, more egalitarian, and more compassionate place,
saying, “Your imagination, your initiative, and your indignation will determine whether we build
a society where progress is the servant of our needs, or a society where old values and new
visions are buried under unbridled growth. For in your time we have the opportunity to move not
only toward the rich society and the powerful society, but upward to the Great Society”, and
“But most of all, the Great Society is not a safe harbor, a resting place, a final objective, a
finished work. It is a challenge constantly renewed, beckoning us toward a destiny where the
meaning of our lives matches the marvelous products of our labor”. 9 Johnson does gesture at
more concrete aims as the speech continues, but the speech as a whole is defined by a
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participatory, community-based, spirit and an interest in the psychological, spiritual, and
emotional nature of the program as well as its more material aims.
There is a fundamental dissonance between these different ways of understanding The
Great Society. For modern historians, The Great Society has become defined by its least famous
participants, by the ways in which it devolved power, and the way it challenged traditional power
structures. Lyndon Johnson’s sales pitch for The Great Society is bombastic, but presents a
collective vision of The Great Society and a collective struggle for it. The writers at The Nation
understood The Great Society in a fundamentally different way. When analyzing this massive
collection of programs, again and again The Great Society is understood through the lens of
President Johnson. Johnson’s faults are The Great Society’s faults; his personality is imprinted
into the program.
While the specific interpretations and analyses of Johnson and The Great Society in The
Nation are idiosyncratic, the framework with which they approach the issue is consistent
between writers. In an editorial entitled “Another Johnson Gimmick”, its author, reporting on a
relatively minor loan repayment bill, wrote that “the President will probably get his way on the
expanded loan participation plan for which he has been cracking the whip with exceptional
sharpness. The plan is one of those legislative gimmicks that will add millions to the taxpayers’
burden but will no doubt improve the President’s image as a great economizer and budget
slicer”. Later, they continued down this path, writing, “Ordinarily the Democrats are partisans of
‘Low Interest,’ but the President’s arm twisting has kept them in line thus far”. 10 For this writer,
Lyndon Johnson is the primary actor within the American political system. Although he has to
deal with the unruly Democratic Party, Johnson is able to force through his preferred legislation,
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even when that legislation goes against the beliefs or self-interest of individual representatives.
Furthermore, Johnson’s actions are framed as, if not sinister, underhanded---prioritizing his
image above all other concerns. This brief, barely two page report commenting on recent
developments in congress is unremarkable except for the way in which President Johnson, and
the role of the office of the presidency, is characterized. The accuracy of this reporting is not
important. Instead, the way in which writers at The Nation understood Johnson as such an allconsuming figure is the lens in which the collection of articles about The Great Society during
the Johnson administration offers insights into the minds of the liberal thought leaders who wrote
for the magazine.
Johnson’s personality is treated as explanatory by The Nation’s writers. More
specifically, when they go about interpreting The Great Society and The War on Poverty, again
and again they rely on Lyndon Johnson’s personality, his unique strengths and weaknesses, to
make sense of his domestic programs. Whether reacting to the plans and proposals in 1964 and
1965 or looking back on its perceived failure in 1968 and 1969, this framework recurs
throughout the pages of The Nation. For example, in a 1968 piece titled “Requiem For the Great
Society”. Writing little over a month after Johnson had announced he would not be seeking
reelection, the author argues that, contrary to the resounding feeling of victory, or at least relief
that Johnson's duplicitous presence would finally exit the White House, Johnson’s presidency
was a tragic failure. He continues, “I shall suggest to you...why the fall of the House of Johnson
has tragic implications for all of us”.11 The bulk of the essay consists of an analysis of why
exactly the potential of the Great Society was squandered by Johnson. First, he highlights the
contradiction between Lyndon Johnson’s political style and personal history and The Great
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Society’s call for community. He writes, “Community presupposes that citizens can depend upon
one another in a fundamental way for social, economic and even psychological support. Thus, it
seemed odd that Johnson, a consensus practitioner of long standing, should transcend his
background in political brokerage for a new position of such radical dimension. The truth is that
Johnson never really transcended his past experience. His political style was fixed”. 12 In this
view, The Great Society’s success hinged on Johnson’s own political evolution---The Great
Society could only succeed if its break with traditional politics was accompanied by Johnson’s.
Without that, it was doomed.
The essay moves onto another key lens for understanding the Great Society’s failure,
Vietnam. Here, he lays the blame again on Johnson’s personal failings. Observers, both at the
time and after have argued that by pursuing the Vietnam War, Johnson doomed his domestic
programs. The author concurs, writing, “I said earlier that even partial fulfillment of the Great
Society would have meant a good deal. But even partial success was impossible once the
Vietnamese War went its terrible way”.13 However, again here he returns to Johnson’s
personality as the main reason why this was the case. Pointing out that Johnson relied on the
voices of the same hardline anti-communist thinkers that been brought into the White House by
JFK. He writes, “his strategy of escalation seems to have been, at least in the beginning, as much
as a function of unconcern with foreign affairs as of hard-line attitudes”.14 Continuing, he traces
the continued escalation of the way, and Johnson’s continued refusal to accept alternatives,
writing, “Whether or not Johnson was personally committed to such views, he became
committed to the men who held them, for the politics of interest places a higher premium on
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loyalty to men than it does on fidelity to position. It was not long, therefore, before defense of
policy and defense of men coincided, and Johnson himself, despite his training in the school of
compromise, grew almost into a caricature of the anti-Communist ideologue. Once that
happened, the Great Society was doomed”.15 In this version, the Great Society’s success hinged
upon Johnson moving against the tide of established thinkers. Instead, because he was at first
uninterested in foreign policy, and later because he, stuck in his old school, horse-trading
political mindset, is unable to do so. Again, the spotlight is permanently fixed on Johnson and his
personal defects---Johnson’s politics of interest, Johnson’s inability to break free of that political
style---those are the reasons that the Great Society failed. 16
Writers at The Nation were not writing in a vacuum. Nor were they interpreting the
actions of President Johnson or programs The Great Society in one. They operated within
traditions of liberal thought, of analysis of the presidency, of understanding Lyndon Johnson, and
countless others. Moreover, presidents do not simply act and let others interpret their actions.
They try to manage public perception for obvious reasons, as they are elected officials, as well as
attempting to shape, in real time, how people understand them and their actions.
Johnson’s personality, the subject of such explanatory power in The Nation, is also the
subject of intense scrutiny from biographers and historians. Johnson’s character was defined by
his mental flexibility---best demonstrated during his tenure as Senate Majority Leader---able to
hold together a democratic party that threatened to collapse in on itself at any moment. 17 He
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The 1957 Civil Rights Act is emblematic of his political skills. Johnson, both aware that his presidential
ambitions would never be realized if he was seen as a Southerner and that, as conditions for Black
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understood the fundamental incoherency of the Democratic Party that he led, and was able to be
just enough things to just enough people to wield power. Johnson was relentlessly ambitious, a
genius politician, funny, charming, impossibly hard-working, amoral, cynical, compassionate,
crude, abusive, brave, and almost every other adjective all at once. As president, he seemed
wooden, inauthentic, and mechanical on television, but in person he could be a hurricane. The
unique scale of Johnson’s personality makes some of the significance The Nation’s writers
placed on it understandable.
The Nation’s writers assume that The Great Society could have been realized, if not for
Johnson occupying the presidency. Simultaneously, inside the White House, attempts to
streamline the unwieldy federal bureaucracy came to a much different conclusion. Johnson, like
presidents before him18, was interested in streamlining the White House and faced pressure to do
so by those interested in efficient government. Furthermore, the scale of The Great Society
begged for a corresponding re-organization of a White House that had created entirely new
bureaucratic knots. During the Eisenhower administration, studies of the presidency revealed
fundamental problems in its ability to govern. Arnold quotes Milton Eisenhower, who said, “I
am absolutely convinced that the task...is an impossible one, that the responsibilities cannot be
redeemed as the Constitution and the laws require, and this constantly becomes more acute as
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our country grows...and the responsibilities of the President increase”. 19 The massive programs
of the Great Society were accompanied by yet another overlapping layer of bureaucracy.
Johnson, at least before administration collapsed, was interested in reorganization.
Multiple plans were commissioned and considered, although as Johnson’s political strength
waned he gradually lost interest in them. However, the reports signal just how fundamental the
problems in the White House were. For example, the White House had no ability to evaluate its
programs. “This paper highlighted for the task force the paucity of evaluation of programs in
government. It suggests a necessary connection between basic research on social problems and
the analysis of program performance. The paper observed that there was virtually no organized
effort in government to analyze the social mechanisms of the problems addressed by policy”.20
Furthermore, “As staff director Bohen put the issue: ‘The staff has reservation about the
desirability, efficacy, and utility (especially to the President) of superimposing a Presidential
structure on top of a host of rather fundamental weakness and problems within the structure of
American Government, which the new volume of complex domestic social programs has
exposed’”.21 And although The Great Society’s ambition revealed weaknesses, “[Colomubia
Professor Wallace Sayre] saw them as connected to the traditional issue of presidential
management ‘the needs of the president require that his leadership over the executive agencies in
Washington be greatly improved in strength before he is asked to risk his resources in field
coordination of the executive agencies, particularly to equip regional officials with the power of
decision”’.22 While The Nation’s writers saw a President either unable or unwilling to fulfill the
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dream of The Great Society, the people brought in to study the organization of the government
suggest that the American Government itself was a significant problem, and made the largescale, inter-department coordination required to accomplish a program as complicated as The
Great Society almost impossible.
As President, Johnson’s personality was also becoming the focus of media coverage
because of the evolving nature of the media. For much of American history, the president
communicated to a relatively small group of people. Technological development opened up mass
communication, and politicians gradually realized its potential. As radios became ubiquitous,
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s fireside chats created a more intimate relationship between the president
and the nation, his voice suddenly beamed into homes across the country. Truman
institutionalized what FDR created, establishing norms like presidential press conferences.
Television became a fundamental part of American life during the 1950s, and Presidents
Eisenhower and Kennedy understood the effects of the new medium and took advantage of it.
The radio brought a president’s voice into americans’ homes; television brought in the
president's face. This brought a new level of intimacy to the relationship between the president
and the people. Eisenhower took full advantage of the more personal relationship.23 Benefitting
from an unassailable image as the general in charge of D-Day, he calmly won two terms on the
strength of his general popularity. In Mary Stuckey’s words, “one cannot conceive of the
eighteenth-century electorate announcing that they liked George (or John or Tom Jim); yet the
slogan most often associated with the 1950s is undoubtedly ‘I like Ike’”. 24 Eisenhower
23
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understood the effectiveness of his personal popularity and took care to shape his public image to
maintain it. He presented himself as different from a politician, closer to an average person. He
avoided negative campaigns, trying to maintain this anti-political style through his public
humility and geniality.25 Eisenhower carried that strategy into his television appearances, where
he was adept at conveying honesty and frankness through the screen. However, television
becoming the standard occasionally hurt Eisenhower, as “increased presidential speech led to the
expectation that the president would speak. Eisenhower was criticized for not speaking out, or
for not speaking out strongly enough, on the issue of civil rights. He was also criticized for not
responding publicly to McCarthy”. 26 Television’s development gave the president the ability to
address the nation at will. But that ability, combined with the need of television stations for news
to cover, and the lucrative nature of presidential news, broke down some of the barriers between
the president and the public.
The Kennedy administration is fundamentally connected to television---his victory is
commonly attributed to his performance in the first televised presidential debates, while his
assassination, and the subsequent assassination of Oswald, was experienced through television.
The debate itself is notable for its dryness---Kennedy won through style instead of substance,
appearing confident, handsome, and young, while Nixon looked uncomfortable and clammy--and this focus on style is emblematic of both television’s effects and Kennedy’s understanding of
them.27 Once in office, television continued to change the way the presidency operated.
Presidential press conferences were televised for the first time, instantly changing the way the
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president communicated information to the nation, allowing Kennedy to go over the head of an
obstinate Congress unwilling to pass his legislative agenda. However, creating this pipeline also
fundamentally changed the relationship between president and press. Presidential press had
previously been primarily off-the-record---presidents were generally candid to the press---and
reporters knew far more information than what they passed on to the public. But, as the televised
press conference was primarily an opportunity to speak to the public, the press lost their
privileged place near the president.28 Kennedy, much like Eisenhower, understood that his
popularity was primarily due to his image as a courageous and noble champion of America, and
thus cultivated that image as much as possible. This is a problem for the president when “the
requirements of public relations [seem] to supersede the requirements of governance. The
rhetorical opportunities of the office [become] constrained by the need for a continual flow of
presidential messages as television and the public habituate themselves to an expectation of a
continual presidential presence”.29 It was in Kennedy’s (and Eisenhower’s) interest to depict
themselves as valiant crusaders, but the reality of presidential weakness in the face of a hostile
legislature or bureaucracy meant that as the public image of the president became more
important, and as presidents both became more adept at shaping their image, and more reliant on
their public image to gain power, their “control of the rest of leadership is likely to slip away--congressional relations become a burden, both Congress and the bureaucracy become alien,
enemies, for they impede the functioning of the ‘real’ government, the government centered in
the White House. Once the understanding of the rest of the government as equally legitimate...is
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lost or weakened, presidents return to mass leadership, this time because they have no other
choice if they are to govern.30
Television beat Johnson into the presidency by only a few years. Johnson, who had
successfully used the media to further his ambition throughout his career, understood the media
and media members---in his helpfully vulgar style---as tools with which to increase his
popularity.31 As president, he was unable to control the media, and his attempts to do so
contributed to a growing enmity between the White House and the press corps. Before winning
his Senate election, Johnson, via his wife Lady Bird, acquired a radio station. The radio station
works as a fitting symbol for much of Johnson’s interactions with the press as president--although he had been on the cutting edge of politics for much of his life, he had not kept up with
television’s transformative effects---and his inability to adapt both made him unable to control
his portrayal by the media and disliked by that media.32
Upon assuming the presidency, Johnson quickly attempted to integrate the media into his
political system, rewarding positive coverage with access while isolating critical voices. 33
However, he found that the national media was unwilling to be a conduit for information.
Journalism was becoming as interested in creating stories as relaying them. Not only was the
president no longer privileged with complete control of their personal image, Johnson’s person
was far too fantastic to be ignored as material. Johnson had been part of national politics for
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decades; to his detriment, he knew how previous presidents had been granted protection by the
media, notably both FDR’s and Kennedy’s health problems. Appearing “presidential” for those
presidents was aided by a media who hid potentially image-altering information. But, because of
both the increasing assertiveness of the media and Johnson’s outsized personality, Johnson was
not just unable to effectively control his image but actively portrayed in a negative personal light.
Johnson’s media strategy was obsessed with the need to appear presidential---but images of
Johnson as a dignified statesman was hopelessly undercut by images of his personal foibles,
while images of Johnson as a voice for the voiceless were undercut by images of him concealing
bombings in Vietnam.
The Nation’s writers analysis of The Great Society and President Johnson reflect, reveal,
and contribute to the effects of media evolution on the presidency. The framework by which they
understand The Great Society and its relationship to Johnson was developed in response to the
changes in style and position of the presidency, even if those columnists didn’t understand the
long-term ramifications of the changes. They attempted to understand, and in doing so give a
glimpse into the process by which the new standards of the presidency were internalized.
Returning to the “Another Johnson Gimmick Editorial”, the writer clearly views Johnson as
more interested in style over substance, writing, “The President will probably get his way on the
expanded loan-participation plan for which he has been cracking the whip with exceptional
sharpness. The plan is one of those legislative gimmicks that will add millions to the taxpayers’
burden but will no doubt improve the President’s ‘image’’ as a great economizer and budget
slicer”34. Johnson wants to be seen as an economizer so he throws his weight behind a bill that
will help him appear as one, despite the bill being, in the eyes of the writers, wasteful. The
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contradictions inherent to the presidency reveal themselves in these sentences. The president
needs to be conscious of their image and must actively work to maintain it, aware that his ability
to govern depends on it, despite the fact that he constantly acts in opposition to that image---both
as part of his day-to-day activities and while constructing it. Finally, Johnson’s inability to meet
this challenge is apparent. Johnson is unable to manage the gap between his image and his
actions. Johnson’s “credibility gap”35 is often understood as a reflection of the secrecy and
untrustworthiness of his administration, but the president relies on obfuscation and confusion of
their actions in order to maintain their public image. Johnson’s problem was the unsuccessful
nature of his image crafting, which was so thin that even a minor legislative attempt at appearing
economical could be immediately seen through by a writer at The Nation.
When read en masse, common links between The Great Society and Johnson in The
Nation appear. Especially by the late 60s, analysis of the Great Society was nearly identical to
analysis of Johnson’s person. One writer puts it as bluntly as possible when describing its failure,
writing, “A better explanation, however, rests more with the man than with events”.36 Just as
before, he argues that what prevented The Great Society from being realized was Johnson’s
personal defects. Continuing, he says, “Johnson failed because essentially he is a fickle romantic
(except in his own business life), a trifler (except in military matters). Much more concerned
with defending his pride than with holding a people together, Johnson surrounded himself with
and took advice from tired men, toadies and second-raters”37. Again, not only does this
emphasize the link between Johnson’s person and The Great Society, and not only does
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Johnson’s person doom The Great Society, Johnson’s flaws are both an inability to project a
“presidential” image38, and being too focused on his personal image. This critique is echoed in
an article entitled “Feuding Over Poverty” from 1964. The author, discussing the Mobilization
For Youth program’s involvement in radical activities such as tenant organization, the New York
Daily News’s smear campaign against them (with the help of the police), and the difference
between Kennedy and Johnson, writes, “The new President made poverty a major issue, but he
was not committed emotionally to Mobilization as Kennedy had been. Though Johnson called it
one of the most promising anti-poverty projects, it did not bear his stamp at a time when he
desperately wanted to accomplish something for himself”. 39 Again, The Nation’s writer’s saw
Johnson as too focused on his own personal image, unwilling to support an effective anti-poverty
program because of his desire to differentiate himself from Kennedy. Furthermore, Johnson,
unlike Kennedy, is unwilling to support the program when it desperately needs support, under
attack by the New York political establishment. This is consistent with numerous examples of
writers attacking Johnson for his devotion to polling and popularity---instead of a public servant
he is a public opinion servant.
Johnson’s performance issues made the situation irreparable. In the essay “The Great
Society: An Old New Deal”, the author puts this as bluntly as possible, writing, “In any
evaluation of the Great Society, it is important to understand the President’s attachment to this
consensus approach. It follows but does not lead. Indeed, it represents the abdication of
leadership. Its primary source of information is the poll. It reacts to crisis but does little to
prevent them from materializing in the hope that somehow the periodic swellings will subside
without an eruption. Above all, it wants to love and be loved by all, and by failing this to be
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loved by as many as possible. Its supreme objective is to win elections, and elections can only be
won, in its opinion, only if it can somehow divine where the consensus lies”. 40 This quotation
contains both the relationship between Johnson and the media, and the contradictions inherent in
the presidency and Johnson’s inability to manage them. While Johnson tries to appear
“presidential”, he is a poor salesman. Because he is perceived as empty, doing whatever the polls
say is most popular, his Great Society is empty, designed for popularity and image rather than
function. Johnson, a genius politician, is unable to fulfill the duties of the presidency because the
president does not operate as a politician. Instead, they are more like a combination of a celebrity
and mascot. As politics is subsumed into television, good politicians become less valuable,
especially compared to good tv. The writer lambasts Johnson for being self-interested, but
Johnson’s real mistake is in being seen as self-interested. Image, style, and public relations
suture the country to the president, disguising the gaps between the public goals and private
actions of the president.41 Johnson, unable to do so, could never be seen as “presidential”, and
thus was subject to scrutiny. Once investigated, the gaps between his public and private
administration, already bursting at the seams, defined his image, rather than the other way
around.
Johnson’s struggles with the media anticipate the struggles that would become inherent in
the modern presidency. His immediate predecessors, Eisenhower and Kennedy, began to face the
constraints of a televised presidency---the contradiction between an increasingly hard to
understand world and country and the stylistic language of television that rewards simple, easyto-follow narratives---but they were able to maintain coherence through the strength of their

40

41

Rousseas, Stephen W. Nation 200, no. 19 (May 10, 1965): 499–501.

It also works proactively, as JFK discovered after the Bay of Pigs. Despite the embarrassing failure, his popularity
kept rising, confounding the president.

personal image. Unable to weaponize his personal image, Johnson’s 42 “public speech was often
designed to obfuscate their actions, and who sought public support at the cost of public honesty.
The slippage between presidential speech and presidential action became both clear and painful.
Their successors have learned to present themselves so as to obscure this slippage, but presidents
since Johnson seem to be more concerned with their images in the public mind than with the
issues those images were thought to be based on. Their rhetoric shifted from emphasizing
specific policies to emphasizing the legitimacy of the presidential role and rights to take
action...the process of governance is wholly intermixed with the processes previously associated
with electioneering”43. Johnson’s presidency shows, and taught, just how dangerous this
balancing act could be. Politicians had generally understood the best way to improve public
image is a program like the Great Society---something that provides a clear benefit to a large
number of people. The New Deal being the obvious model.44 Roosevelt’s immense popularity
directly translated to political power---congressmen were scared of the consequences of
opposing him. In Texas, the young, ambitious state youth administration leader, Lyndon
Johnson, won a surprise victory over a crowded field by positioning himself as the most proRoosevelt candidate. Johnson, having spent his entire career learning how to work the levers of
Congressional power, was successful in passing a New Deal type program, but it had little effect
on his image. Instead, Johnson’s legislative efforts were perceived only through the lens of his

Johnson and Nixon faced many of the same problems, but this essay is focused on Johnson’s specific role, and
thus arguments about either grouping them together or differentiating the two, while interesting, are outside the
scope of this essay. Furthermore, while Johnson and Nixon are often grouped together in their public failures and
tarnishing of the presidency, Nixon’s downfall via Watergate was fundamentally different from Johnson’s gradual
loss of legitimacy.
43
Stuckey, Mary E. The President as Interpreter-in-Chief / Mary E. Stuckey. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House
Publishers, 1991.
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Yet, The New Deal was not just a program, as I have shown, Roosevelt’s utilization of radio was a profound shift
in the relationship between president and people, combining with the desperation of the Great Depression and New
Deal to create such a passionate base of support.
44

image---the equation seemed to have been reversed---his public image was not a result of the
Great Society, The Great Society’s perception was a result of his public image.
Not only did future presidents encounter the same constraints as Johnson, they learned
from his failures. 45 In the immediate aftermath, presidents Ford and Carter generally avoided risk
as much as possible when managing their images. 46 They found that an anti-image image, just
like an anti-politics politics, ran into difficulty wielding power. An amusing example is the
Chevy Chase influenced image of Ford as clumsy and bumbling---Ford encountered the same
problems as Johnson---when the presidency takes place on television, coming across poorly is
disastrous. And while Johnson’s flamboyant Texan mannerisms, vulgarity, and fundamentally
political nature rubbed reporters and the public the wrong way, especially over television which
robbed Johnson of all of his strengths while displaying his weaknesses, Ford’s mistake was
simply to fall down, and without a strong public image, found himself defined by his satirists.
In this way, Johnson acts like a prism, glimpses of whom are visible in each successive
president. Every president who followed him was faced with the same basic problems. Johnson
undoubtedly failed---The Nation, along with the rest of the country, make clear that Johnson was
not worthy of the job. But both nations were unaware and uninterested in the impossibility of
Johnson’s task. Johnson had no choice---he needed to try to control his image. He came into
office without winning an election, one year before the next one. His predecessor did succeed at
building his image, and combined with his death, he threatened to blot Johnson out completely.
Johnson had built his power through political genius in the Senate. When he finally achieved his

45

They learned from his limited successes as well---he set the standard for presidential disaster visits, taking
advantage of television to publicly comfort victims.
46
This is of course more complicated than simply avoiding risk---the image of “I’m not projecting an image” is one
that still requires projection---but the intricacies of the public relations strategies of the 70s presidents is beyond the
scope of this essay.

lifelong obsession of the presidency, he found that his political skill was useless, while his faults
were broadcasted for the world to see. Yet, through failure Johnson created the rubric for
success. Johnson is reflected by subsequent presidents because subsequent presidents operated
within the framework he established for the office. He was unable to smooth over the everincreasing number of fissures that threatened to unravel the country, but by trying, he created the
penumbra of a phantom president that could succeed. The combination of his specific
circumstances and his specific person meant that he couldn’t manage a position that had become
a combination of mascot and oracle, but by trying he established the parameters his successors
worked within.
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